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Abstract
 In this paper, we use a spatial competition model developed by Pal (1998) to analyze producer 
imposed retail price ceilings and producer assigned exclusive geographic sales territories. Two 
wholesale distributors are presumed toeach have a single collection point respectively from which 
they supply retail outlets at many locations. Each wholesaler chooses the quantity to ship to each 
outlet and the retail prices attain market clearing levels. Given that he costs of shipping depend 
on distance, this system results in a kind of waste in that he products are not shipped exclusively 
from the nearest collection point. As pointed out by Matsumura (2002) this wasteful cross-
hauling can be prevented if the manufacturer assigns exclusive geographic territories to the 
distributors. But the costs of administering anexclusive territory system may well outweigh any 
savings in shipping costs. In this instance amanufacturer stipulated price ceiling may be the 
preferred alternative. By controlling not only the manufacturer price but also the retail priceat 
each location, the manufacturer can deter wasteful cross-hauling and expand the overall channel 
profit, while also conferring enlarged consumer surplus.
JEL classification: D43, L13, L42. 
Key words: Spatial quantity competition, location choice, manufacturer assigned 
geographic territories, manufacturer stipulated maximum retail prices
exclusive
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1. Introduction 
 Where the independent wholesale distributors ofa branded product are Cournot rivals, a kind 
of wasteful cross-hauling can arise inwhich more than one of the wholesalers-and ot only the 
nearest and least cost wholesaler-supply the same retail location. If this sort of "reciprocal 
dumping" adds ignificantly to logistic osts, the manufacturer may well intervene to correct the 
situation and see that each retail location is supplied only by the nearest wholesaler. The 
manufacturer could do this by assigning each wholesaler an exclusive sales territory, and then 
imposing vertical restraints o counteract the successive monopoly distortions. Such is the basic 
logic of Matsumura (2002). We extend the argument by showing that the manufacturer can 
achieve nearly the same result without explicitly assigning exclusive wholesale territories merely 
by stipulating maximum retail prices. Such a regime is not only profitable for the manufacturer 
but also expands output, lowers prices and enhances consumer surplus. This example of welfare 
enhancing resale price maintenance thus joins others including the Spengler (1950) control of 
successive monopoly argument, Telser (1960) promotion of special services argument, and Flath 
and Nariu (1989; 2000) deterrence of revenue corroding price discounts under uncertain demand 
argument. 
   There are many examples in Japan in which manufacturers stipulate resale prices. This is 
known as the tate-ne (lit. "set-price") system. There are very few instances of Japanese 
manufacturers as igning exclusive wholesale t rritories. In our algebraic example the two regimes 
achieve nearly the same allocation, but there are ways in which an exclusive territory system 
would be more costly to administer than the tate-ne system. The thrust of our argument is that 
the ubiquity of manufacturer stipulated resale prices in Japan and elsewhere may be simply to 
economize on transport costs. 
  We shall proceed as follows. In Section 2 we develop a basic model of spatial prices (i.e. 
delivered prices) under Cournot quantity competition between the two distributors ofa branded 
product. We then show that this regime gives rise to wasteful cross-hauling that would not be 
present in a regime of vertical integration between manufacturer and distributors. Then in Section 
3 we show that an exclusive territory system can in principalattain the same first-best outcome 
as the complete vertical integration regime. In Section 4 we analyze a manufacturer stipulated 
retail price ceiling as an alternative second-best. Finally in Section 5 we compare all three regimes 
and draw some conclusions.
1
2. The Model 
  Our basic set-up is one in which Cournot rivals first choose their own spatial locations, and 
then choose the quantities toship to each final demand location. A couple of authors have already 
analyzed this situation and we will draw on their findings. Specifically, Anderson and Neven 
(1991) showed that in the linear spatial model the Cournot rivals locate close together. But Pal 
(1998) showed that in the circular spatial model the Cournot rivals locate as far apart as possible. 
We follow the Pal, circular city approach. 
  Let us assume that the final demand for a branded product is the same at each retail outlet 




where p is the retail price at the location (i.e. the delivered price), and "a" is a scale parameter 
(and the vertical intercept of the demand curve). We shall presume that there is a monopoly 
producer of the good and to keep matters imple let the marginal cost of production be zero. Let 
there be two independent distributors of the product (i=1,2). And suppose further that each of 
the distributors has a single collection point somewhere on the perimeter of the circle, from 
which it ships the good to retail outlets also located on the perimeter of the circle, for sale to the 
final demanders. To keep matters imple we will assume that the arrangements between each 
distributor and the retail outlets bring about he same allocation as would vertical integration 
between the distributor and retailers. This might entail vertical restraints of some sort or another 
which we will not attempt to specify precisely. We presume that he retail outlets are numerous 
and equidistant from one another. That is the retail outlets are uniformly dense on the perimeter 
of the circle. The cost of shipping the good from collection point o retail outlet is t per unit of 
distance. We presume that the demand is sufficiently large in relation to shipping costs that 
a>-2t. We also assume that consumers' transport costs are prohibitively great' 
  Under the set of conditions just described we posit a three-stage game. First, the 
manufacturer chooses a shipping price r, and may also assign exclusive territories or stipulate a
maximum retail price. Then, the two distributors, given the shipping price, each simultaneously 
and independently choose a location for their collection points xi (i=1,2). Then, in the third and 
final stage the distributors each independently choose shipping quantities and allocate their 
respective shipments across the retail outlets; the retail prices at each outlet adjust to market-
clearing levels and the product is sold to the final demanders. Within this basic set-up we 
analyze three alternative r gimes. In the first the manufacturer controls only his own shipping 
price r. In the second regime the manufacturer controls the shipping price r and also assigns an 
exclusive geographic territory to each distributor. In the third regime that we consider, the 
manufacturer controls the shipping price r and also imposes a retail price ceiling, but does not 
assign exclusive territories.
2-1. Coumot Quantity Competition 
  We analyze this regime recursively, that is by taking the three stages in reverse order. In the 
third and final stage, at any retail outlet location x, each distributor i obtains profit yi as follows:
(2) y1(gi,gj,x,r) = (a - (qi+qi) - r - t-dist(x,xi)) qi
where qi is the sales quantity at the location and dist(x,xi) is the shortest distance (along the 
circumference of the circle) from distributor i's collection point to the retail outlet. Now the 
equilibrium Cournot Nash quantities q c ofeach of the distributors and corresponding retail 
prices p and profits yi are as follows:
'Under this assumption the market demand at each location is independent of the demand at any 
other location.
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(3-1) giC(x,xi,xj,r) _ ( a - r - 2t-dist(x,xi) +t-dist(x,xj) )/ 3 
(3-2) pc(x,xi,xj,r) _ (a + 2r + t-.dist(x,xi) + t•dist(x,xj) )/ 3 
(3-3) yiC(x,xi,xj,r) = CpC(x,xi,xj,) - r - t-dist(x,xi) ) gjC(x,xi,xj,r) 
                   qi (x,xi,xj,r) 
  Next, consider the second-stage. Without loss of generality let the collection points of the 
respective distributors be such that 0.<x1<x2=1/2. Thenthe total profit of distributor 1from sales 
at all retail outlets, denoted by y1C, can be expressed as follows: 
(4) ylC(xl,r) = of "1 ((a - r - 2t(xi-x) + t(1/2-x) )/ 3)2 dx 
               + Xi f~~Z ((a - r - 2t(x-xi) + t(1/2-x) )/ 3)2 dx 
               +,/,f X1+' ((a - r - 2t(x-x1) +t(x-1/2) )/ 3)2 dx 
               +X1+YZf 1 ((a - r - 2t(xl+l-x) + t(x-1/2) )/ 3)2 dx 
               ( 12(a-r) 2 -6t(a-r) + 3t2 + 8t2x12(4x1-3) )/ 108 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximizing choice of collection point location 
x 1 by distributor 1 are 
(5-1) ayiC/ax1 =4t2x1(2x1-1)/9 = 0 , 
and 
(5-2) a2yiC/ax, 2 = 4t2(4x 1-1)/9 < 0 . 
From these conditions we deduce that he solution is x1=0.2 In other words the principle of 
maximal differentiation applies; the two distributors adopt respective collection point locations at
maximal distance from each another. Under this condition the equilibrium retail prices, sales 
quantities, and distributor p ofits are as follows: 
(6-1) pC(x,r) _ (a + 2r + t/2)/ 3, Vx 
(6-2) glC(x,r) _ (a - r - 2t-dist(x,0) + t•dist(x,l/2) )  3 
(6-3) g2C(x,r) _ (a - r - 2t•dist(x,1/2) + t-dist(x,0) )/ 3 
(6-4) yiC(r) _ (4a2 +4r2 + 2rt + t2 - 8ar - tat )/ 72
2The choices of x
1=0 and x1=1/2 both fulfill the necessary condition for a profit maximum but 
only the former fulfills the sufficient condition. Because yic is a monotone decreasing function 







  Finally, and continuing to analyze the game recursively, we reach the first stage in which the 
manufacturer sets a shipping price r. We suppose that he manufacturer by imposing afranchise 
fee Fi=y1C(r) fully appropriates the gross profit of each distributor. The. manufacturer's profit 
thus becomes the following. 
(7) nC(r) = r(a-pC) + 2F; _ (4a2 + 4ar - 8r2 - 2at - rt + t2)/ 18 
Now from the necessary condition for maximum anufacturer p ofit with respect to shipping 
price (a1r/d'r =(4a-16r-t)/l8 = 0 ) we have the following 
(8) r = a/4 - t/16 
Substituting this into the previous result gives 
(9-1) pC(x) = a/2 + t/8, Vx 
(9-2) g1C(x) _ (3a/4 + t/16 - 2t-dist(x,0) +t-dist(x,1/2) )/ 3 
(9-3) Qc(x) = a/2 - t/8, Vx 
For there to be complete coverage of the market by each distributor (that is for distributor 1to 
sell even at the location of the rival's collection point x2=1/2, and vice versa), it is necessary that 
a>5t/4.3 
  The manufacturer profit, consumer surplus and social surplus under the regime just analyzed 
are as follows. 
(10-1) ~C = (48a2-24at+ llt2)/ 192 
(10-2) CSC = (QC(x))2/  = (4a-t)2/ 128 
(10-3) SSC = n + CS = (144a2 - 72at + 25t2 )/384 
  We next consider the regime in which manufacturer and distributors are vertically integrated.
2-2 Vertical Integration 
  We now turn attention to the case in which manufacturer and distributors are vertically 
integrated, continuing to maintain the same basic assumptions regarding demand and costs-the 
same linear final demand at each location, zero marginal costs of production and constant unit 
cost per, distance in shipping from collection point to retail outlet. The vertically integrated 
firm's profit at each location x is the following 
(11) 1t(x,x1,x2) _ ( a - Q - t - min(dist(x,xi), dist(x,x2)) )Q
3This condition is fulfilled by our earlier assumption that a?2t.
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where at xl and x2 are the locations of the two collection points. The vertically integrated firm 
ships merchandise to each retail outlet only from the nearer of the two collection points, xi say. 
Iii accord with this presumption, we simplify the previous expression as follows: 
(11') it(x,xi) _ (a - Q - t.dist(x,xi) )Q 
The profit maximizing choice of quantity (such that a7r/aQ=O) is 
(12-1) Q*(x,xi) _ (a - t-dist(x,xi) )/2 
The implied retail price and profit generated by sales at the retail outlet located at x then become 
(12-2) p*(x,xi) _ ( a + t-dist(x,xi) )/2 
and 
(12-2) 1L*(x,xi) _ (a - t.dist(x,xi) )2/ 4 
  The vertically integrated firm chooses the two locations for its collection points so as to 
maximize its profit. Without loss of generality, let the locations be such that 0 < xl <_ x2= 1/2. 
Then the retail outlets upplied by shipments from collection point 2 are those with locations x
such that 
(1/2+xl)/2 < x <_ (3/2+x1)/2. Consequently he vertically integrated producer's profit becomes 
(13) 7c(xi) = 2( (~i~+xl)/212 (a-t( /2-x))2/4 dx + y 32+X1)/2 (a-t(x-1/2))2/4 dx )
Maximizing this profit with respect to choice of the location of the first collection point yields 
xl*=0. The two collection points are at maximal distance from one another. 
  Finally, the price and sales quantity at each location x, the overall profit from sales at all 
locations, and overall consumer surplus and social surplus are as follows: 
(14-1) p*(x) _ ( a + t-dist(x,xi) )/ 2 
(14-2) Q * (x) _ (a - t-dist(x,xi) )/2 
(14-3) it* = (48a2 - 12at + t2) /192 
(14-4) CS* _ (48a2 - 12at + t2) /384 
(14-5) SS* _ (48a2 -12at + t2) /128 
  Comparing these results with those from the other egime, we find that at all locations x, the 
price is lower p*(x) _< pc(x), the sales quantity greater Q*(x) >_ Qc(x), the total profit greater 
7t*>7tc, and consumer surplus also greater CS*>CSc, under vertical integration than under 
independence. This has a simple explanation. Under vertical integration the quantity sold at 
each retail ocation fulfills the condition marginal revenue quals marginal cost, while under the
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independent distributor regime this condition is violated-the same quantity is sold at each 
location even though the marginal cost is greater for outlets that are farther from collection 
points. Additionally, under the independent distributor regime both distributors sell at each retail 
outlet even though one has greater marginal cost of shipping than the other. As a result, not 
only is the overall marketing channel profit less under the independent distributor regime than 
under vertical integration, consumer surplus is also lower.
3 Exclusive Sales Territories 
  Manufacturer assignment of exclusive geographic sales territories is one possible way of 
increasing profit without vertically integrating. In this section we analyze the equilibrium under 
such a regime. 
  The exclusive t rritory regime has the character of a three-stage game. In the first stage the 
manufacturer chooses the shipping price r and also assigns each of the two distributors an 
exclusive territory [xj, xi]. Then, in the second stage, each of the two distributors chooses the, 
location of its collection point. In the third and final stage the distributors choose shipment 
quantities and allocate the shipments across retail outlets, which determines the market clearing 
prices, profit, and consumer surplus. 
  Again proceeding recursively, in the third and final stage the profit at each retail outlet 
location x is 
(15) y;T(x,xi,r) _ (a - Q - r - t-dist(x,xi) )Q
The profit maximizing quantity ateach outlet (from dyiT/dQ=O) is 
(16-1) QT(x,xi,r) = (a - r - t-dist(x,xi) )/ 2 
The implied price and profit at the retail outlet located at x thus becomes 
(16-2) pjT(x,xi,r) = (a + r + t•dist(x,xi) )/ 2 
and 
(16-3) yjT(x,xi,r) = (piT(x,xi,r) - r - ttdist(x,xi) ) QiT(x,xi,r) _ ( a - r - t-dist(x,xi) )2/ 4 
and the overall profit of each distributor i at all retail outlets is 
            xi 
(17) YiT = x_iJ yiT(x,xi,r) dx 
  At the second stage ach distributor i chooses the location xi for its collection point. It is self-
evident hat the profit maximizing choice is to locate the collection point at the center of the 
distributor's exclusive sales territory [x-,                             xi]. In other words, x; (x + xi)/2. 
  Finally, continuing to proceed recursively, in the first stage the manufacturer chooses the 
shipping price r and assigns exclusive territories. Again we shall presume that he manufacturer
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by imposing a franchise fee F;T=y;T(r), fully appropriates the gross profit of each distributor. 
From the symmetry of the case it is evident hat the manufacturer will assign equivalent 
territories to each of the two distributors. Thus let us suppose that the manufacturer assigns to 
distributor 1the sales territory [3/4, 1/4] and assigns distributor 2 the territory [1/4,3/4] splitting the 
market equally. Then the franchise fee becomes
(18) FT = y1T = 2 ors°(a-r-tx)2/4 dx a
and the producer profit can be expressed as follows: 
(19) 7t = 4 o f4r(a-r-tx) dx + 2FT 
       = 4 orr(a-r-tx)/2 dx + 4 of"°((a-r-tx)2/4 dx 
       = 2 of 4r(a-r-tx) dx + ors°(a-r-tx)2 dx 
       = o f4 (a-r-tx)(a+r-tx) d  
       = (48a2-48r2-12at+t2)/192
From the profit maximizing condition 
(20) rT = 0
(an/ar =0) we have that the shipping price is zero
This has a simple interpretation. By setting the shipping price equal to marginal cost (=0) the 
successive monopoly distortion is avoided, and by means of the franchise fee the manufacturer 
fully appropriates the resulting profit. Here, the implied price and sales quantity at each retail 
location xbecome
(21-1)pT(x) = (a + t-dist(x,x;) )/ 2
and
(21-2) QT(x) _ (a - t-dist(x,x1) )/ 2 
The producer profit, consumer surplus andsocia 1 surplus are as follows
(21-3)7tT = (48a2 - 12at + t2 )/ 192
and
(21-4)CST = ( 48a2 - 12at + t2 )/384
and
s
(21-5)SST = (48a2- l2at+t2)/ 128
  Here notice that equations (21) are identical to the corresponding equations (14). In other. 
words, through the assignment of exclusive territories the manufacturer attains the same first-
best outcome as under vertical integration.
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  Because ach distributor would profit from selling outside of its assigned territory, one 
presumes that there would be costs to the manufacturer of enforcing compliance. In the event 
such costs become large, a manufacturer stipulated retail price ceiling might be a preferred 
alternative. And here we might interject that a system of manufacturer stipulated "standard etail 
prices" or "suggested retail prices" may well amount to the same thing as a price ceiling given 
demanders resistance to any prices that exceed such stipulations.
4 Price ceiling 
  Under the regime of manufacturer stipulated maximum retail prices, again we envision athree 
stage game. In the first stage the manufacturer chooses its shipping price r and also stipulates a 
maximum retail price pU<a.4 Then in the second stage each distributor chooses a collection 
point, and in the third and final stage ach chooses its shipment quantities. In the event hat the 
price ceiling is binding for both distributors at any location we shall assume that they just meet 
the demand and divide sales equally. 
  Again proceeding recursively we begin by considering the last stage. In the event hat the 
manufacturer imposes a binding price ceiling on sales at a retail location it must be that the 
Cournot price lies above the ceiling:
(22) pc _ (a + 2r + t/2)/ 3 > pU = r+m 
where m=pu-r is the retail price-cost margin if the ceiling is binding. If the manufacturer 
stipulated price ceiling is not binding then we suppose that he price is the result of Coumot-
Nash choice of sales quantities by the two distributors and, as under the regime analyzed in 
section 2,the implied equilibrium retail price would not hen depend on the location. 
  Furthermore, neither distributor i will make any sales at a retail location x for which its retail 
margin m is less than the unit cost of shipping the good from its collection point at xi. That is it 
will make no sales if: ttdist(x,xi) > m. Define then zu=m/t, anupper bound on the distance that a 
good will be shipped from collection point to retail outlet. 
  There are three possible configurations of distributor i's sales at any location x.First, it might 
be a monopolist forwhich the manufacturer stipulated price ceiling is not binding. Second, it 
might be a monopolist for which the price ceiling is binding. And third, it might be in a 
duopolistic equilibrium with the other distributor. Specifically, for any retail outlet located atan 
x such that z=dist(x,xi)_zu anddist(x,xj)>zu, the distributor i isa monopolist, and it either sets 
the monopoly price pM=(a+r+tz)/2, or charges the manufacturer stipulated price ceiling pU, 
whichever of the two is lower. In the case in which p < p ; the price ceiling is not binding and it 
sets the monopoly price. Its profit from sales at the outlet located at z is 
(23) yM(r,z) = (a-r-tz)2/ 4
Alternatively, if pM>pU and the price ceiling is binding, then its profit from sales at location z 
become
41f pU>a
, then the price ceiling is not binding. Notice that we presume the price ceiling pU is the 
same at every location. If it could do so, the manufacturer would in general set a different 
ceiling at each location, but we assume this is infeasible.
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(24) yU(r,z) = (pU-r-tz)(a-pU) = (m-tz)(a-m-r) 
  In the remaining instances for which the distributors find themselves in a duopolistic 
situation, that is for locations x such that z=dist(x,x1) <_zU or dist(x,xj) <_ zU, the equations (22) 
clearly establish that the price ceiling is binding. Accordingly, the quantity demanded at each 
such location is Q=a-pU =a-m-r, and the two distributors, as per our assumption, each supply half 
of this.5 The resulting profit of each from sales at such a location are thus
(25) y°(r,z) = (m-tz)(a-m-r)/ 2
  Now define boundary locations zMu where the manufacturer stipulated price ceiling is just 
binding. We have (from pM = (a+r+tz)/2 = r+m = pU) that zmu = (r+2m-a)/t. The following are 
some useful observations:
 z _ (r+2m-a)/t < m/t = zU r+2m-a < m r+m-a < 0 pU = r+m < a 
From this and from pU = r+m < a, it follows that zMu < zU. 
  Next we turn attention to the second stage, the distributors' choices of locations for their 
collection points. Here notice that from equations (23) - (25) each distributor's profit is a 
monotonically decreasing function of z. Furthermore for given values of r and z we have that
yM(r,z) >_ yU(r,z) >_ yD(r,z) ,
from which it follows that each distributor's profit is a single-peaked function of the location of 
its collection point. Furthermore, as the collection points lie closer to one another the region of 
duopoly expands and the region of monopoly is constricted, with consequent erosion of the 
distributors' profit. For this reason they each seek to place their respective collection points as 
far from that of the rival as possible. More precisely, without loss of generality, let the collection 
point of distributor 2 be placed at the location x2=1/2, and let that of distributor 1 lie at the. 
location x1 such that, 0_<x1<1/2. There are then two cases to consider. In the first case, m<t/4, to 
obtain monopoly profit the distributor 1locates its collection point so that: 0 < x1 < 1/2-2zu. In the 
second case, m>-t/4, the distributor 1locates its collection point at x1=0. 
  Finally, we consider the first stage in which the manufacturer chooses the shipping price- and 
retail price ceiling. Here notice, first, that if m>t/2, the two distributors both sell at every 
location. Second, if the collection point of distributor 1 lies in the region (0,1/2), then based on 
the analysis of section 2, the profit maximizing retail price p*(x) lies in the interval [a/2, a/2+t/8]. 
Therefore, the profit maximizing manufacturer stipulated price ceiling must also lie in this same 
interval. That is to say,
5Under a binding manufacturer stipulated price ceiling
, if both distributors independently choose 
quantities then multiple Nash equilibria are possible. We sidestep these analytic difficulties by 
arbitrarily imposing the simple assumption that the two distributors share the quantity demand 
equally.
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(26) p*(0) = a/2 < pu <_ a/2 + t/8 = p*(1/4)
Here we propose the following 
Lemma: If a/2:5 pu S a/2+t/8 and m <_ t/2, then pM > pu 
 Proof: r = pu-m >_ a/2-m (pu > a/2) 
         >_ t-m (a >_ 2t) 
       >_ t - t/2 = t/2 (m:5 t/2), 
  from which 
      pM(x) >_ pM(0) = (a+r)/2 >_ a/2 + t/4 >_ pU 
 Q.E.D.
  From the Lemma it is clear that it is profitable for the manufacturer to stipulate amaximum 
retail price that is binding at every retail location. First if m51/4, then, at any location, at most 
only one of the two distributors can sell at the ceiling price pu. Furthermore, if m < t/4 then there 
will exist locations not served by either distributor. The manufacturer again imposes afranchise 
fee to appropriate he distributors' profit. The manufacturer's profit attains 
(27) it = 4 o j(pu-r)it(pu-tx)(a-pu) dx
A
The manufacturer's profit is thus an increasing function of the retail margin m. The 
manufacturer raises the retail margin until just the point that all the retail outlets are served, in 
other words to m=1/4. Then the manufacturer's profit becomes 
(28) it = 4o1'°(pu-tx)(a-pu) dx = (a-pu)(8pu-t)/ 8 
From the profit maximizing condition (dit/dpu =0), we have that 
(29) pu = a/2 + trl6 
The implied profit maximizing manufacturer shipping price becomes: r= a/2 - 3t/16. 
  In the remaining instances 1/4_<m-<1/2, at leastsome of the retail ocations are served by both 
distributors. The manufacturer's p ofit becomes 
(30) 1t=4 (Jiz - ~t (pu-tx)(a-pu) dx + ntr(pu- t/4)(a-pu) dx )
Notice that in this instance wasteful cross-hauling is present. That is, some retail outlets are not 
supplied exclusively by shipments from only the nearer of the two collection points. For this 
reason there is a marginal benefit to the manufacturer from lowering the retail margin and 
thereby shrinking the region served by both distributors. Accordingly, the manufacturer again 
sets the margin at m=1/4. The manufacturer profit attains the form of equation (28). The price 
ceiling becomes pu=a/2+t/16, and the manufacturer shipping price becomes r=a/2-3t/16. The 
manufacturer profit, consumer surplus, and social surplus are:
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itt U (8a-t)2/ 256 
CS U (8a-t) /512 
SSU= 3(8a-t)2/ 512
5 Conclusion: Comparison of regimes, and empirical implications 
  Equilibria under the three regimes considered above-Cournot competition, exclusive 
territories, and. manufacturer' stipulated price ceiling- are depicted in Table 1. The location of 
collection points of the two distributors are the same under all regimes. The other outcomes 
depend on the parameters. As depicted in Figure 1, the retail prices are highest under the 
Cournot regime, and near to the distributors' collection points are lowest under exclusive 
territories, while farthest from the collection points are lowest under the price ceiling regime. 
Accordingly, the consumer surplus at each location also depends upon both the regime and 
distance from collection point. Where retail price is lower, the consumer surplus is greater. 
Near a collection point, consumer surplus is highest under the exclusive territory regime. Far 
from the collection points, consumer surplus is highest under the price ceiling regime. Consumer 
surplus is lowest at all locations under the Cournot regime. Furthermore, producer profit, overall 
consumer surplus and social surplus are all highest under the exclusive territory regime, and 
lowest under the Cournot regime. Here notice that given that a >- 2t, 
 (7rT-e)/1tT =(t2/768)/((48a2-12at+t2)/192) = t2/4(36a2+12a(a-t)+t2) 
        < t2/4(144+24+1)t2 = 1/676 < 0.002 
From this it follows that by stipulating maximum retail prices the manufacturer can obtain early 
as great a profit as under the exclusive territory regime-which attains the same gross profit as 
vertical integration, a first-best. Consequently, where the costs of administering and enforcing 
an exclusive territory system are large, the manufacturer may well decide to stipulate maximum 
retail prices instead. Resale price maintenance that is for this reason- elimination of wasteful 
cross-hauling by wholesalers- is welfare-enhancing. Our explanation thus joins other examples 
of welfare enhancing resale price maintenance. These include the Spengler (1950) example of 
manufacturer stipulated retail price to counter the distorting effect of successive monopoly, the 
Telser (1960) example of RPM to promote retailer provision of special services, and the Flath 
and Nariu (1989, 2000) example of RPM to prevent revenue corroding price discounts when 
demand is uncertain. 
  Finally, we end by considering the empirical relevance of our explanation for manufacturer 
stipulated maximum retail prices. In 1960's Japan, distribution transactions in many product 
lines were carried out not under an exclusive territory regime but rather under the so-called tate-
ne (lit. "set price") system in which the manufacturer stipulates all resale prices. The tate-ne 
system very much resembles the manufacturer stipulated price. ceiling regime analyzed here. In 
the model of this paper 'we presumed that arrangements between wholesale distributor and 
retailers were analytically equivalent to their vertical integration. Operationally, this might mean 
that the wholesaler fully appropriates the profit of the retailer by levying a flat-fee. But under a 
tate-ne system in which the manufacturer stipulates the retail price, such a flat-fee (paid to the 
wholesaler by the retailer) does not arise.
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  Under the tate-ne system the manufacturer determines not only the quantity to ship to each 
wholesaler but also stipulates for each wholesaler and each retailer the shipping price pR, the 
wholesale price p and retail price p Then each wholesaler determines the quantities to 
ship to each retailer qU=a-pU. Because the wholesale price and retail price are equal the 
retailers realize no profit and the wholesaler collects no franchise fee. Each wholesaler does 
realize a pro fit,6 which the manufacturer appropriates by levying a franchise fee and 
attaining for itself the profit nU. This is exactly the same outcome as that of the manufacturer 
stipulated price ceiling in our earlier dsicussion. In other words the allocation under the tate-
ne system is exactly as under the manufacturer stipulated maximum retail price regime with 
wholesaler and retailers effectively vertically integrated with one another. 
  Notice in this instance, that is under the tate-ne regime as just described, that for any 
retailers farther from the wholesale collection point than a distance of 1/4, the unit cost of 
transport is actually higher than the wholesale margin (pU-rU=V4). Consequently, neither 
wholesaler has any incentive to sell in the other's market and wasteful cross hauling is strictly 
avoided. Nor does either wholesaler collect a franchise fee from the retailers. And further, 
under the tate-ne system the double margin problem is avoided without reducing the shipping 
price or wholesale price below the level that would be set by a vertically integrated 
manufacturer and wholesaler firm. Accordingly, if multiple retailers should occupy nearly 
the same location there can be no possibility of sales above the "manufacturer suggested 
retail price", and no necessity to rely upon consumer aversion to such pricing in enforcing the 
price stipulations. 
  Attainment of maximum profit in the exclusive territory system requires that the 
wholesalers trictly observe the territorial stipulation. But each will in fact have an economic 
incentive to sell to retailers in the other's territory, and by levying a franchise fee collect from 
the retailers a share in their Cournot-equilibrium profit. This behavior by the wholesalers 
will erode their combined profits and thus lower the franchise fees that the manufacturer is 
able to impose upon them. To prevent this the manufacturer will have to actively monitor the 
wholesalers' compliance with the territorial stipulation if it is to attain a first-best outcome for 
itself. The tate-ne system avoids these difficulties. 
  Another reason why the tate-ne system became common in Japan during the high growth 
era (the 1960's) is the following. In that period, along with the proliferation of new products 
the growth of the Japanese conomy broadened the demand for consumer goods generally. 
Under these conditions, it may not be wise for a producer introducing a new product hat 
initially has small demand but for which it expects to eventually have large demand, to assign 
inevitably broad exclusive territories to the few wholesalers initially willing to distribute the 
product. This is because once the demand expands and it becomes profitable for more 
wholesalers to carry the product, the manufacturer will face the troublesome prospect of 
revising and renegotiating the original exclusive territory contracts. In contrast, under the 
tate-ne system the manufacturers were largely able to avoid wasteful cross-hauls while 
avoiding the costs of administering and enforcing an exclusive territory system.
6The wholesaler profit equals the wholesaler's margin times the qua
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Figure1.Comparisonofretailprices
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